There was a time in Pakistan when anybody who was somebody decorated himself with a medal or two for defeating Soviet Union in Afghanistan. They claimed that the fall of Communism in the Soviet Union was due to its defeat in Afghanistan. Therefore it was the Jihad, they supported and participated in, that disintegrated the Soviet Union, ran the argument.
And in Afghanistan the argument must not have been more articulate than that in Pakistan or the West because practically the leading ideologues of this Jihad were out of Afghanistan. Afghanistan was the laboratory, the battleground.
The Soviet Union supported the Communists in Afghanistan who shared its ideology. But the Americans planned and got “Jihad” executed by others. Those who worked for Americans for money and the Jihadis who actually fought did not share ‘American or Western values’. The result was that with American money and support they disintegrated Afghan society itself. American money and support and Pakistan’s role was not for Afghan people or for building their country in the first place. Therefore Afghan people have a case of destroying their country and disintegrating their society against America and Pakistan while peoples of Pakistan have a related case against the Americans for corrupting and involving their rulers in their imperialist and therefore anti-civilization enterprise for which the peoples of the region are suffering even today.
It is a common perception of our people, which by and large is not untrue, that this indirect control of Pakistan by the American-led West began in the very beginning of Pakistan. And the perception is not wrong because when the British relinquished their control of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 and India became independent, one cannot detect any desire or urge in the leadership of the Muslim League to make their newfound country an independent state. This question never arose in them.
Their independence was solely their separation from Hindus. Like children, this was the end of their politics. The Muslim leadership, which was very comfortable with the British, had been tamed by them to fit in their overall policy of perpetuating their rule in India. Basing on Muslims’ anti-Hindu prejudices, the colonial power which had remained in direct control of the subcontinent from about one hundred to two hundred years between 1757 to 1947, depending upon the place of reference, was successful in channeling Muslim opinion away from their occupation which was real to the spectre of Hindu supremacy which was imaginary. It was a sort of veto power in their hands against the Hindus given to them by the British for a wrong which had yet to be committed.
This calculated and considered policy of the British was successful in making the Muslim elites dependent upon them. Already down and degraded, the British kept them under their wings and when left passed them over to the Americans. Since the Mughals fell, who had stood on their own in the world, the ship of the Muslims of pre-1947 India remained detained in the British imperialism’s harbor. And since 1947 the ship of Pakistan is detained by American imperialism and has not been able to set on any voyage. The captains and the crews of the ships over all these years have enjoyed their long holiday and have been happy not to face the rigors of the high seas and be on their own there.
The question is for what the ‘reward’ of Pakistan went to such people? Put simply, they had delayed India’s independence. But at deeper level, it is the story of weakness of humanity and civilization generally vis-à-vis their rulers, dominant classes and their ideologies and therefore not specifically our specialty. The human weakness is not going soon and today although in a different context humanity is facing similar and perhaps more complex problems. But then, Pakistan was not necessarily the ‘reward’ for them. There can be another angle of the story for one who is not an ideologue. It could be the story of how history dealt with those Muslim elements who had become nasty for good society and civilization.
By giving Pakistan, history, in fact, duped them. The new owners of the new state, recycled and refurbished, thought they had avenged and ‘defeated’ the Hindus by getting back — at least some of the — ‘lost power’. This was the ideology. But it was not true. Neither they had defeated the Hindus nor had they got back the lost power. In fact history, which is in a way the story of human struggle for civilization, separated them, which they thought was their achievement, from the larger Indian scene where they would have remained a thorn in the side of a very large part of humanity. And in the next step, history freed and separated more than half of Pakistan from the clutches of their ideology. And today they have practically reached their end game in the remaining Pakistan. It is as if history dealt in steps in defeating them.
During all this period they never tried to come out of their degradation. What to talk of a struggle, they never aspired for a renaissance. The reverse had to happen. Hence their deterioration which never stopped and made them hardened criminals. Criminalizing Pakistan thoroughly and embracing Afghanistan at some such a stage under the supervision of American and Zionist criminals, they have made the whole region of Pakistan-Afghanistan inhospitable for humanity and civilization.
How humanity re-asserts and establishes civilization in the region will really be the ‘Great Game’ for the world to witness in the coming years and decades. Obviously, whatever the obstacles, no part of the world can remain crime infested for long. And then we are too numerous, too innovative and capable to leave our affairs in the hands of criminals.
Putting in simple words we can say that in the course of history our region met this accident. We have to understand it and salvage whatever is salvageable and build new and better than before and move forward.
A question arises here which can be of help. Could have the predecessors of the present-day ruling elites of Pakistan ever avoided this fall? Was there not even the remotest possibility of that?
The answer is, no. How could they have stopped falling when the British policy had irreversibly deepened their already existing narrow-mindedness? There seems to be no possibility at all. And this disqualified the Muslim leadership to build the new state of Pakistan on any reasonably acceptable and civilized parameters. They behaved like robbers, plunderers, thugs and what not and there was hardly any exception. They used any edifice, personality or idea, which was sacred for the masses to repeatedly cheat them. Swindling at every step and continuously squeezing the space under the feet of the people, who could have never thought of it being ever taken away from them, they have left nothing even spiritual uncorrupted which was the last refuge of the weak and the rejected.
The bewildered humanity is now adrift hoping against hope and apparently nowhere to find solace. There were obviously many fundamental and foundational defects in the ideology of those who were in the forefront in establishing the new State of Pakistan. But time was needed for their becoming visible to the masses.
The embrace of such a Pakistan has cost Afghanistan dearly. But why, Afghanistan went into Pakistani embrace, in the first place? Put simply, Afghanistan had its own problems, which had not been addressed in time and therefore was vulnerable.
It can be argued that Afghan rulers had remained contended to keep their population underdeveloped, although winds of change continued to blow over Afghanistan from the north as well as from the south. The attempted moves for modernization were too weak and administrative in nature to overcome the inertia of Afghan society against change. I believe the same can be said about the efforts of King Amanullah (1919-1929) which were the highest point ever reached by any Afghan ruler for modernization of his country. Two European powers Russia and Britain remained rivals over Afghanistan for about one hundred (1813-1907) years in which the British dominated for most of the time. Even with so much contact with the British, the leading power of the modern world as their neighbour in India for about a century, the Afghan ice did not get the required heat to thaw. And then in 1917, there was perhaps the most momentous event of the twentieth century next door – the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. Whatever was happening in these biggest and most advanced laboratories of human affairs of the world remained available for a very long time to Afghans to learn from. If all these changes could not move Afghan leadership to enter the modern world on their own, it proved to be a recipe for future disasters. To nobody history gives special treatment. In physics we say that every action has an equal and opposite reaction. But in human affairs, we can say that even a non-action – when we fail to act in time – can have unimaginable and comparatively far bigger consequences.
Therefore the interpretation can be that the failure of Afghan leadership for a very long time in upgrading their country, socially and economically had left great voids, which others tried to fill. The present generations of Afghans are paying the price with their lives and blood for the neglect of their forefathers. And basically, Pakistan’s story, as you have read, is not dissimilar. Can anyone expect any of the two individuals whose heads are not in their right places to give benefit to or get it from the other? Perhaps, therefore, Afghanistan and Pakistan were destined to damage each other.
Therefore in knowing something of worth about Afghanistan in the present situation, which in fact has become our dire necessity, it is just appropriate to begin, if not from earlier, with the person who, during his career, practically dominated the whole of Afghanistan-Hindustan region for about twenty to thirty years. There are more than one defining moments before and after the mid-eighteenth century of the history of this region which can be said to be solely attributable to him. He was Ahmad Shah Abdali or Durrani – Ahmad Shah “Baba”, the “Father” of Afghanistan.
Ahmad Shah Abdali was an army commander of the Persian Emperor Nadir Shah and was with him when in 1739 he invaded India and took back with him the famous Peacock Throne to Iran. When Nadir Shah was killed by a group of dissident officers, Ahmad and some 4,000 of his cavalrymen escaped with the treasury Nadir Shah always carried with him for payments and bribes en route. Ahmad and his Abdali horsemen rode past Herat and southeastward, joining the chiefs of the Abdali tribes and clans at a shrine near Kandahar where they finally chose Ahmad who belonged to the “Sadozai clan of the Abdali tribe and whose name he, then, changed to Durrani.” [1]
The Afghans found a leader of genius in Ahmad Shah Durrani. Most probably, “he would have remained the leader of a vigorous people in a barren country but for one of the periodical eras of political confusion in the Indian plains.” [2] The Pashtun tribesmen rallied to his banner, and Ahmad Shah led them on nine or ten campaigns into India in search of booty and territorial conquest.
“He ruled from Kandahar and aimed at uniting all Afghans under his scepter. When he died in 1773 his rule extended to Kafiristan (later Nuristan) and the Amu Darya on the north, to Kashmir, the Sutlej, and the Indus on the east, to the sea on the south, and to Persia and Khorasan to the west.” [3] Sindh had been subject to the Mughal rule from 1591 to 1750. It had then passed to Ahmad Shah. In modern terms Ahmad Shah’s rule, which was short-lived, stretched over Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, parts of India, Iran and Central Asia.
Ahmad Shah’s first attempt on the empire failed at Sirhind, now in India, in 1748. No more of him would have been heard east of the Indus, if the Mughal empire had remained powerful. “In 1749 he again appeared but was bought off by the governor of Lahore. In 1751-2 he appeared again and captured Lahore. This time the imperial government itself bought him off by the cession of Punjab and Multan.” [4] “While his ambassador was away to Delhi, Ahmad Shah Durrani dispatched a strong detachment to conquer Kashmir.” [5] The Mughal governor was easily overpowered and Kashmir became part of Durrani empire. In 1756-57 Ahmad Shah took and sacked Delhi. Agra, Mathura and other places were plundered. The Afghan booty from India was enormous and the details are too painful a reading. Ahmad Shah annexed the Sirhind division to his kingdom, appointed his son Taimur the viceroy of the Punjab and retired to Afghanistan.
“Ahmad Shah entered India, amidst appeals from Muslim leaders of Hindustan, for the fifth time in 1759 and found himself confronted not so much with the Mughals as with the resurgent power of the Hindus represented by the Marathas. The moves and counter-moves of the next eighteenth months culminated in the battle of Panipat on 14 January 1761.” [6]
“The resounding victory which he gained appeared to lay Hindustan at his feet. The Marathas were scattered and confounded, the surviving Mughal chiefs divided and of little power, the English Company still distant in Bengal. But at this moment his troops clamoured for arrears of pay and a return to Kabul. They lacked the tenacity of Babur’s Mughal begs and Hindustan the wealth which had existed in Babur’s day. There is nothing more eloquent of the enfeebled state of the empire than that Afghans should return to their hills because Delhi could not provide them with pay. Ahmad Shah was compelled to lay aside the scepter within his grasp, saving his face by the nomination of Shah Alam as a vassal emperor and Najib-ud-daula as his minister. In fact he had abdicated the empire. He never returned to Delhi and his own kingdom was to break up in its turn within half a century.” [7]
After Ahmad Shah’s death, his son Taimur became the Shah. In his time the Sikh power grew in the Punjab and Sindh was lost and became virtual independent under Talpur Amirs. Taimur died in 1793.
Indeed, it was under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Durrani that the nation of Afghanistan began to take shape after centuries of fragmentation and rule by invaders. In this way, being a nation or on the way to become a nation, as we recognize the nations of the world today, Afghanistan is about two hundred years senior to Pakistan.
A very brief background of Sikhs who were contesting for power in the Punjab even before the appearance of Ahmad Shah Abdali is required here. The Sikhs, or ‘disciples’ were a pious sect of Hindus following the precepts of their first guru Nanak (1469-1539). Thirty-eight years after the death of Guru Nanak, in 1577, Akbar granted to the fourth guru the site of the Tank and Golden Temple at Amritsar, and so established that town as the headquarters of the Sikh faith.
The fifth guru, Arjun, was tortured and executed in 1606 by order of Jahangir, not on account of his religious teaching, but because he refused to pay the fine imposed on him for having assisted Khusru, Jahangir’s rebellious son. The ninth guru Tegh Bahadur was captured in 1675. He rejected the demand of Aurangzeb to embrace Islam, and in consequence was executed in the same year.
It is doubtful if Akbar would have acted the way Jahangir or Aurangzeb acted in the murders of these two religious leaders. Perhaps, Akbar’s policy and acts would not have created such conditions in the first place. History would have, then, taken a different route and for the better. This is how individuals matter in history.
In our time Musharraf compelled Nawab Akbar Bugti to seek protection in the mountains of Baluchistan, where, after being pursued, he was killed. And due to this and other acts of Musharraf, history went on a different route and for the worse.
“The tenth and last guru, Govind Singh (1675-1708), was the real founder of the Sikh military power”, [8] which he organized to oppose the Mughals. After a life of rebellion and war “he decided to support Bahadur Shah (Shah Alam) in the war of succession” after Aurangzeb’s death “and consequently accepted service under that prince when he gained the throne.” [9] He was murdered in the Deccan by an Afghan where he had joined Bahadur Shah.
The guru had met earlier in the Deccan a man known as Banda Bairagi who was leading the life of a hermit. The guru had already heard of his widespread fame and finding him the most suitable person for carrying on his work in the Punjab, entrusted him with his mission in the presence of his Sikhs. He led the Sikhs from 1709 to 1715. He took many retaliatory actions in which Mughal authorities and other Muslims suffered a lot. Banda was finally captured in December 1715 and executed along with many of his followers.
The period of one quarter of a century, following the execution of Banda, may be regarded as the darkest period of Sikh history. It seemed as if the power of the Sikhs had been totally destroyed. But it was not so. A consolidation was taking place and “an opportunity after all presented itself to them. And early in January 1739, they found themselves once more free to indulge in” [10] their rebellious activities. This was done by the invasion of Nadir Shah. “At this time the country was thrown into great confusion, of which full advantage was taken by lawless people and particularly by the Sikhs.” [11] “On the retirement of the Persian invader the Sikhs continued their depredations and were the principal source of danger to the peace and prosperity of the province.” [12]
This was the background which enabled the Sikhs to frequently molest Ahmad Shah during his passages through the Punjab. “’As soon as he had passed the Sutlej, the Sikhs began to plunder the stragglers from his camp, which he forbore to resent at that time, his army being loaded with plunder; however, to secure his camp from insult, he every night threw up a slight work round it, and in this manner he continued his march to the Attock, the Sikhs following him all the way.’” [13]
From Nadir Shah’s invasion in 1739 to the close of Ahmad Shah’s career, the Punjab had become the cockpit of struggle between various powers and had almost been converted into a no man’s land. “The first struggle lay between Ahmad Shah Durrani and the Mughals, in which the former was victorious. Then ensued the conflict between Ahmad Shah and the Marathas, in which the latter were worsted. Now the Sikhs and the Ahmad Shah began to fight between themselves for the possession of the plains of the Punjab and ultimately Ahmad Shah was expelled from this province.” [14]
Overall, we can say that during the eighteenth century the great empire of the Mughals after a “glorious career” of nearly two centuries had fallen into a gradual process of decay. “This confusion was further aggravated” by invasions of Nadir Shah and Ahmad Shah from the northwest “leaving nothing in their wake but the smoke of burning homes, ravished humanity and the reek of innocent blood.” [15]
“Ahmad Shah Durrani displayed brilliant feats of military skill; but he failed in applying the same vigour of character in measures adopted to retain the country as done in securing it. The total gains of his grand successes therefore were not very much. He retired from the field leaving the Sikhs the undisputed masters of the Punjab. His son and successor Taimur Shah remained content with having recovered Multan. His grandson Shah Zaman came here with the determination to repeat the exploits of his grandfather and twice he seized Lahore. He, however, realized what a difficult task it was to retain possession of the capital; so he quitted this country never to disturb it again. Thus this struggle ended by the close of the century, and foreign invasions from the north-eat completely ceased.” [16]
On his retirement from the Punjab in 1799, Shah Zaman confirmed Ranjit Singh in the possession of Lahore, who took Multan in 1818-19 and Peshawar in 1834. When he died in 1839, his Punjab – at one time Afghan territory — included Amritsar, Lahore, Multan, Dera Ghazi Khan, Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu, Kohat, Peshawar, Attock, Rawalpindi, Srinagar, Jammu and Kangra. He had secured himself on the east with the treaty of Amritsar in 1809 fixing “the line of the Sutlej as the boundary between Sikh and British influence; henceforward the Sikhs on the east side of the river, or the Cis-Sutlej states, were under British protection.” [17]
In Afghanistan itself the dissolution came by battle and murder. “Distrusting his own clan he leaned for support on Paindah Khan, chief of the Barakzai clan. Taimur, on his death in 1793, left twenty-three sons, while Paindah Khan in his turn left twenty-one in 1799. Such fruitlessness was too much for stability and amid the interlocking rivalries of the several brothers and the two families the Durrani empire perished.” [18] In this struggle Dost Mohammad, Paindah Khan’s son “held Ghazni and gradually rose to eminence during twenty years of struggle and intrigue. To Ghazni he added Jalalabad and in 1826 seized Kabul and proclaimed himself Amir.” [19]
Just ten years after the nation of Afghanistan began taking shape in 1747, an apparently small but historically very significant battle took place in India between the British and the Muslim Nawab of Bengal. The Nawab was defeated and the nawabship of Bengal came under the control of the British. The British were the masters of their first territorial possession in India. The rise of the British Power in India had begun. Overall, the nawab represented the decaying Muslim ruling classes in India from which after about 150 years, with British encouragement, came out the All India Muslim League – the ‘fruit’ of Muslim decay. Never able to stand to confront the rising foreign power, they accepted the British supremacy in stages. And by 1818 the British were supreme in India.
Therefore, we can say that when Afghans started their nationhood, the Indian Muslims having lost their empire had started going under the British. It is worth pondering that these apparently opposite marches of Indian Muslims (later Pakistan) and Afghanistan have brought these two nations to practically the same ignominious end at the beginning of the twenty first century that their futures have become intertwined in adversity now. The easy way is to point out individual failures of leaders, which does not mean that the leaders did not fail.
Therefore, one can further say that during the past two and half centuries or so, the Indian Muslims/future Pakistanis fell further under the British from an already fallen position, while Afghanistan fell from its independent position due to the British presence in India to which the Indian Muslims/future Pakistanis were serving as props. Further, while Pakistan did not get real independence, because it never aspired for it; Afghanistan lost it, in spite of the fact that in the space of eighty years from 1839-1919, three Anglo-Afghan wars were fought as a result of Afghan refusal to accept British interference in their self-determination. In this way, perhaps, Afghanistan’s fall has been comparatively much bigger.
The British had realized the strategic importance of Afghanistan as early as 1809 but it was not until the reign of Dost Muhammad (1826-63) that Britain began to be actively involved in Afghan affairs. It has been popular to say that the origins of this conflict could be traced to Anglo-Russian rivalry. And that, while the British regarded Russian advances in Central Asia as a serious threat to the existence of the British administration in India, Afghanistan was perceived as a buffer zone between the two European powers. By mid-19th century, Afghanistan had become the focal point of “the Great Game” – a race between Britain and Russia for gaining geo-political spheres of influence in Central Asia.
In a setting when the western border of British India touched the Sutlej, Bahawalpur and Sindh, and there being no direct contact with Afghanistan – Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan intervening — the British invaded Afghanistan to replace Dost Muhammad with Shah Shuja. It was pure aggression. “Kandahar was taken in April 1839, Ghazni stormed in July, and Kabul entered in August.” [20] Dost Muhammad first a fugitive surrendered himself in November 1840. Afghans fought back and the occupation became impossible. “On 2 January 1842 a treaty of evacuation was signed. On 6 January 16,000 men marched out of the cantonments” [21] in Kabul and on the 13th a lone survivor reached Jalalabad. The rest had fallen to the Afghans and the rigours of the winter. “Such a disaster had never previously befallen a British-Indian Army.” [22]
But like a revengeful and more powerful man who will not spare his enemy even if he himself is on the wrong, the British retook Kabul on 16 September, got released European prisoners, blew up the great bazaar of Kabul and on 12 October, evacuating the city, the army retired by way of Khyber pass. Interestingly as if representing Hindu India, the British took with them “the gates of Mahmud of Ghazni’s tomb which were thought to be those which Mahmud had removed from the temple of Somnath in Gujarat in 1025. In fact they were of a common pattern and later date.” [23] The move seems to placate soldiers of the predominantly Hindu army of the East India Company.
“Dost Muhammad was now allowed to return to his country. He soon reasserted his authority and died in 1863, at the age of eighty, still in possession of power.” [24] The passivity of Russia showed that what the British called counteracting “Russian advances” in Afghanistan was the excuse, the saleable deceptive political slogan, which looked protective of what was already British in India. In fact, it was British imperialism’s appetite for colonization and subjugation of other nations, which was at work.
The British concluded a treaty of friendship with Afghanistan in 1855. “In 1856 the Persians occupied Herat, then controlled by Dost Muhammad. Afghanistan was now a friendly country and a force was accordingly sent to the Persian Gulf, which induced the Persians to make peace and evacuate Heart in May. The incident was of importance because it cemented British Indo-Afghan friendship and helped to secure Afghan neutrality” [25] during the mutiny which followed shortly afterward. Dost Muhammad refrained from capturing Peshawar which he had lost to Ranjit Singh in 1834. He finally captured Herat in 1863 and died a few days later at the age of eighty. There followed the war of succession and Dost Muhammad’s third son Sher Ali finally defeated his rivals.
Now it was Sher Ali’s turn to face the British. “He feared the British in refusing and his own subjects in accepting. He was between two fires. Early in 1877 he finally declined the British embassy.” [26] In July 1878 a Russian general arrived in Kabul. The invasion followed. It was another pure British aggression against Afghanistan. “The usual successes brought about the flight of Sher Ali in ominous repetition of the events of 1838.” [27] “Sher Ali died the following year and peace was made with his son Yaqub in May 1879.” [28] “By the treaty Kurram, Pishin, and Sibi were assigned to British control, a resident was established at Kabul with agents elsewhere, and the Amir undertook to conduct his foreign relations in accordance with British advice. In return the British engaged to support Yaqub against aggression and pay Yaqub an annual subsidy of 6 lakhs of rupees. It seemed that Afghanistan had now at last become an Indian protected state.” [29] But within six weeks of his arrival in July the new envoy was murdered with his escort in a popular uprising. The massacre took place on September 3rd, 1879. This gave the British the pretext to bring their armies immediately to occupy Kabul (October) and, after the abdication of Amir Yaqub Khan, to assume direct control of the government of Kabul. General Roberts was in charge.” [30]
Abdur Rahman, son of Sher Ali’s brother and former rival Afzal Khan, “had long been in Russian Turkistan and used by the Russians as a potential threat to exercise pressure on Sher Ali.” [31] He was recognized in July 1880 as Amir of Kabul on the “conditions of having ‘no political relations with any foreign power except the English’, and confirming the cession of Kurram, Sibi, and Pishin. In return the British promised an annual subsidy and abandoned the claim to post a resident at Kabul”. [32] Conquering Kandahar from Ayub Khan for the amir, the British withdrew from Kabul and next year from Kandahar. Abdur Rahman died in 1901 and his son Habibullah assumed power without incident. It was during Abdur Rahman’s rule that the border between British India and Afghanistan was agreed upon in 1893 and the famous Durand Line which is now the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan was drwan.
Hibibullah permitted many refugees who under his father had been forced to leave the country, to return. They included the Tarzi family and that of the Musahiban, both of whom in later years would take prominent roles in the country’s development.
After a bad start, the cause of which was the British “dictatorial approach” a new treaty was signed in 1905. And in 1907, Habibullah paid a long state visit to India. In the same year an Anglo-Russian convention was signed defining the respective spheres of influence of the two powers from Tibet through Afghanistan to Persia. In August 1914, Habibullah announced to remain neutral in the war, in spite of the fact that the Sultan of Turkey, Caliph for the Muslims had proclaimed jehad. For this the British were not thankful to him. Britain and Turkey were opponents in the First World War.
“On February 20, 1919, Habibullah was assassinated on a hunting trip. He had not declared a succession, but left his third son, Amanullah, in charge in Kabul. Because Amanullah controlled both the national treasury and the army, he was well situated to seize power. Within a few months, the new amir had gained the allegiance of most tribal leaders and established control over the cities.” [33] Amanullah came to power just as the entente between Russia and Britain broke down following the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Indian political situation was agitated with anti-British sentiments.
Within months, Amanullah proclaimed jehad and “sent his army to invade India”, where the political situation had resulted in heavy demands for troops for internal security duties. “Amanullah attacked the British in two thrusts, taking them by surprise. The Afghan forces achieved success in the early days of the war as Pashtun tribesmen on both sides of the border joined forces with them.” [34] “A completely new war made the situation desperate. British units were weak, short of reinforcements and fast losing men for demobilization; many of the regular units of the Indian Army were still in the Middle East.” [35]
A look at the Indian, especially Punjab, scene here will be of much help. At the outbreak of First World War the government of India armed itself with a Defence of India Act, but it possessed in addition Regulation III of 1818. While these powers interfered with Congress Party’s political work for home rule the government wanted even more powers against ‘terrorism and revolutionary activity’. Justice Rowlatt’s recommendations were embodied in Bills in a matter of weeks. The war ended in November 1918. But the government continued with the Bills to retain emergency powers because the Defense of India Act would now lapse. “The Bills became law early in 1919 [March] against the vote of every non-official Indian in the Imperial Legislative Council.” [36] “At this moment Mahatma Gandhi stepped forward into leadership. He organized hartals in protest against the Rowlatt Acts which speedily turned into riots in Delhi, Ahmedabad, Lahore, and Amritsar. In Amritsar on 13 April a ‘prohibited’ meeting was held in the large enclosed space known as Jallianwallah Bagh, and was broken up without warning by a body of troops under General Dyer. The casualties were officially estimated at 379 killed and over 1,200 wounded. There was only one exit which the troops occupied. This was followed by the proclamation of martial law.” [37]
“The Afghans opened the war on 6 May 1919 by attacking the western end of the Khaibar Pass. For three days, until the arrival of regular troops, the Khyber Rifles, the irregular militia, who held the forts up the pass, gave a good account of themselves but Khilafat agitators had been busy among them preaching the cause of a holy war, and when Afridi tribesmen, who had been watching events from the surrounding hills, joined the enemy, they deserted on a large scale. The corps was disbanded and was not reformed until 1945.” [38]
“The arrival of reinforcements from Peshawar had been delayed by the need to deal with a rising in the city which was a part of the same wave of unrest that had swept over the Punjab. The attack on Landi Kotal was repulsed with little difficulty.” [39]
“A second Afghan army under General Nadir Khan moved into Khost and from there attacked the fort at Thal, at the south end of the Kurram valley. The army was repulsed and defeated by a relieving force under General Dyer, who had been in command at Amritsar. The garrison of Chitral in the far north had had no difficulty in beating off a small force that attacked them, and in the south the Quetta garrison crossed the frontier about Chaman and captured the Afghan fort of Spin Baldak.” [40]
“While Nadir Khan’s army was still in Khost, before moving to attack Thal, there was the possibility that his objective might be the post in the upper Tochi valley held by the North Waziristan militia, who could not be expected to hold out unsupported by regular troops – and there were no troops to send to help them. When the decision was taken to evacuate the garrison the Wazir elements deserted during the withdrawal, and there followed two anxious days at the headquarters of the militia at Miranshah. The Afridi platoons, who were also showing signs of restlessness, were sent away to Dera Ismail Khan, but the remainder of the Corps remained loyal to render useful service during the trouble of the ensuing twelve months.” [41]
“Similar action had to be taken at Wana, the headquarters of the South Waziristan militia, where the British officers led out the loyal elements by way of Zhob valley. There was nothing left on which to keep the corps in existence, and it was not re-raised until three years later.” [42]
“The tribesmen, richer by two thousand rifles and nearly a million rounds of small arms ammunition, saw the withdrawal as a sign of weakness, presaging a complete withdrawal from Waziristan, if not to beyond the Indus; and they were only too ready to listen to intrigues and encouragement directed at them by Amanullah’s agents. Waziristan lapsed into a state of anarchy, leading directly to the bitter fighting that began in November 1919 and went on for two years.” [43]
And overall, the British “placed a hundred and forty thousand men on the frontier, and in eight days, at one of the hottest seasons of the year, defeated the main thrust of the enemy. The situation was now much as it had been at the end of the first stage of the Second Afghan War; the British had defeated their enemy in battle but had failed to impress the fact on the Afghan people and it was a very truculent party of delegates who arrived at Rawalpindi to discuss a treaty of peace. [44]
“The advent of Amanullah’s rule inaugurated an extraordinaary and arguably long overdue stage, making a watershed in the quest by Amanullah, Mahmud Tarzi and their ‘Young Afghan’ followers for reforms, independence and statehood. The politics of gradual change and development pursued in fits and starts by earlier Afghan rulers gave way to sustained efforts to initiate a radical process of change, so as to place Afghanistan in the ranks of modern states as quickly as possible.” [45]
“Amanullah’s ten years of reign initiated a period of dramatic change in Afghanistan in both foreign and domestic politics. Starting in May 1919 when he won complete independence in the month-long Third Anglo-Afghan War with Britain, Amanullah altered foreign policy in his new relations with external powers and transformed domestic politics with his social, political, and economic reforms. Although his reign ended abruptly, he achieved some notable successes, and his efforts failed as much due to the centripetal forces of tribal Afghanistan and the machinations of Russia and Britain as to any political folly on his part.” [46]
“Britain virtually dictated the terms of the 1919 Rawalpindi Agreement, a temporary armistice that provided, somewhat ambiguously, for Afghan self-determination in foreign affairs. Before final negotiations were concluded in 1921, however, Afghanistan had already begun to establish its own foreign policy, including diplomatic relations with the new government in the Soviet Union in 1919. During the 1920s, Afghanistan established diplomatic relations with most major countries. ”
“In May 1921, the Afghans and the Soviets signed a Treaty of Friendship, Afghanistan’s first international agreement since gaining full independence in 1919. The Soviets provided Amanullah with aid in the form of cash, technology, and military equipment. Despite this, Amanullah grew increasingly disillusioned with the Soviets, especially as he witnessed the widening oppression of his fellow Muslims across the border.” [47]
Obviously all this could not have endeared Amanullah to the British whose dislike of him “seemingly equalled their aversion to the Bolshiveks. They found in Amanullah’s nationalist militancy serious vulnerability to Bolshivek influence. Another British concern related to Amanullah’s Islamist rhetoric that permeated his anti-British campaign, adding to, and amplifying, the broad anti-colonial and pro-independence agitation then gaining momentum in India and, indeed, the region as a whole.” [48]
“Anglo-Afghan relations soured over British fear of an Afghan-Soviet friendship, especially with the introduction of a few Soviet planes into Afghanistan. British unease increased when Amanullah maintained contacts with Indian nationalists and gave them asylum in Kabul, and also when he sought to stir up unrest among the Pashtun tribes across the border. The British responded by refusing to address Amanullah as ‘Your Majesty’, and imposing restrictions on the transit of goods through India.” [49] It is generally believed that “if fully enacted, Amanullah’s reforms would have totally transformed Afghanistan. Most of his proposals, however, died with his abdication.” [50] But the British who claimed to be the torch-bearers of civilization did not rest until Amanullah was overthrown.
The man who seized Kabul from the faltering hands of Amanullah is usually described by historians as a Tajik bandit. “The new Afghan ruler called himself Habibullah Khan, but he was called by others Bacha-i Saqqao (Son of the Water Carrier). A deserter from the Afghan army, he had worked in Peshawar as a tea seller and then served 11 months in prison for housebreaking. He had participated in the Khost rebellion of 1924 and then had become a highwayman. Although Bacha-i Saqqao robbed Afghan officials and the wealthy, he was generous to the poor. His attack on Kabul was shrewdly timed, following the Shinwari Rebellion and the defection of much of the army.” [51]
Habibullah Kalakani was in the British “Peshawar prison in April 1928” and the duration of his “imprisonment was for three years”. However, strangely, three months after this, he was seen around Kabul in the summer of 1928 “corresponding to the time of returning of Amanullah Khan from Europe, and committing robbery and killing people”, “until his attack upon Kabul.” “His name and his” “curious deeds once in a while were published in the home” as well as “foreign papers.” [52]
It seems the British wanted to insult Amanullah and his legacy by putting such an unusual character in power in Kabul. Obviously this was their stop gap arrangement as they had already decided to hand over Afghanistan to the long tested pro-British ‘Musahiban’ family.
“Usually it is said that he probably tried to do too much and too fast, as some tribal chiefs, landlords, religious leaders, and elements of the army rose up against him. However, since he was strongly challenging and negating the importance of the two empires, particularly the British, he could not implement his plans. Conventional wisdom holds that a tribal revolt that had full support of the British” [rather planned and executed by them] “and grew out of opposition to reform programs overthrew Amanullah. Thus, the King, due to his ‘extreme radicalism’ in Afghan terms, in 1929 faced with overwhelming armed opposition and abdicated the throne to his oldest brother, Inayatullah, who ruled for only three days. In January 1929 Kabul fell to forces led by Habibullah Kalakani; whereas Amanullah Khan, after failed attempts to regain the throne, crossed into India and went into exile first in Italy and then later remained in Switzerland until his death in 1960. It is widely believed that Afghanistan paid heavy price for its independence in terms of institutional, social, political and economic underdevelopment, as well as loosing a capable leader like Amanullah Khan, due to the British conspiracy pushed through religious leaders” and Mohammed Nadir Khan who “in October 1929 with British money and arms and support of southern Pashtun tribes entered Kabul and declared himself as the new King.” [53]
I have dealt with this topic until the overthrow of Amanullah. What is the conclusion? If you have gone through the above pages, I do not think oneness of the region is questionable anywhere. And irrespective of the fact that at any time in history who was fighting whom, the region comprising today’s Pakistan and Afghanistan and beyond — in particular today’s Northern India — was clearly the stage of historical processes – third Panipat being one of them, for example — which affected the region and its people as a whole. And consequently the people got mixed. Add to this the turmoil through which the region passed due to Soviet and American intervention and the dislocation of the people on a very large scale. The result has been that the people got mixed even more. With this background if today’s compulsions demand unity of our region, I believe the Durand Line should be perhaps the weakest line to prevent that. ■